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 Concern is growing that climate change could prove much worse than we 
expect. Recent economic analyses have laid increasing stress on small but 
catastrophic risks (Summers and Zeckhauser, 2008; Weitzman, 2007; Weitzman, 
2009). Richard Weitzman (2009, p. 1) estimates a roughly five percent chance of a 
rise of more than 10°C, and a one percent chance of a rise of more than 20°C. Such 
runaway global warming would impoverish the planet on a scale from which humans, 
even if economic growth someday resumed, would find it hard to recover (McKinnon, 
2009). Yet carbon emissions continue to rise in both North and South. And many 
claim that it is only fair that they should do so. 
 Perhaps the most widely accepted claim about justice between generations is 
that we should leave our descendants enough to meet their basic needs and lead 
worthy and satisfying lives (Krebs, 2001; Malnes, 1995; Meyer and Roser, 2009; 
Page, 2007). This reflects a near consensus that one of our chief goals must be to 
reduce deprivation (Casal, 2007, p. 299), a view that is shared even by critics of more 
demanding theories of intergenerational justice (Beckerman, 1999, pp. 85, 88; 
Beckerman and Pasek, 2001, p. 89). It is also widely agreed that poor countries will 
suffer the worst effects of global warming (Klinsky and Dowlatabadi, 2009, pp. 91-
92; Spash, 2005; Tol, 2008, p. 442; cf. Gardiner, 2004, p. 563; Jamieson, 2005). One 
might assume that this implies aggressive carbon abatement. Yet the most compelling 
objection to drastic cuts in carbon emissions appeals to an egalitarian consideration: 
the expectation that our descendants will be richer than we are.
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 Whether we should „discount‟ consumption benefits to future people—in large 
part because they will be richer—lay at the centre of the debate over the 2006 Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change. Critics argued that on Stern’s 
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projections, even with substantial climate change, future people would still be many 
times wealthier in 2200 than they are today (Godard, 2008, p. 33). By refusing to 
discount, Partha Dasgupta (2007, p. 6) charged, the Review had assumed that „that the 
distribution of well-being among people doesn‟t matter much, that we should spend 
huge amounts for later generations even if, adjusting for risk, they were expected to 
be much better off than us.' The present paper argues that Stern was right not to 
discount the consumption of future people. The problem lies deeper—namely, in the 
assumption that we should seek to maximize utility at all.  
 In the last forty years, utility-maximisation, still pervasive among economists 
analysing climate change, has come under sustained philosophical attack. The most 
influential political theory of the second half of the twentieth century, John Rawls‟ A 
Theory of Justice (1971/1999), explicitly rejects utilitarianism in favour of according 
priority to the worst off. Others stress the importance of ensuring that as many people 
as possible have enough to lead sufficient lives—after which point further increases in 
consumption are morally unimportant (Frankfurt, 1987). Both views have played a 
role in debates about climate change, and both offer natural explanations of why we 
must not sacrifice today‟s poor to tomorrow‟s rich. 
 Extended to the intergenerational context, both the priority and sufficiency 
views require us to minimise deprivation—whether now or in the future. If we are 
sure that future generations of human beings will be materially richer, then this 
weakens the case for drastic carbon abatement. The problem is that disaster cannot be 
ruled out. Confronted with risk, we ought to minimise expected deprivation. Since a 
climatic catastrophe could affect so many people for so long, prioritarianism and 
sufficientarianism call for drastic abatement.  By any moral measure, the rich 
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countries should pay for it. But if they refuse, it is better that action be taken even if it 
is at the expense of today‟s poor.  
 In reality, neither the rich nor the poor countries appear ready to make the 
necessary sacrifices. We need to tap funds from somewhere—and preferably from 
rich people rather than poor ones. I argue that we should look to the rich of the future. 
Through long-term debt and a modest reduction in general investment, we can raise 
substantial funds for greenhouse gas abatement. Provided we prevent catastrophe, 
future people in the industrialized world should still be richer than their counterparts 
today. They will thus be able to pay off government debt without excessive sacrifice. 
Borrowing and reducing investment sometimes exploit future people. But in this case, 
if we transfer enough resources from the future to avert the risk of disaster, we will do 
justice both to our descendants and to ourselves. 
THE LONG SHADOW OF THE FUTURE 
 Much of the effect of our carbon emissions is likely to endure for hundreds or 
thousands of years. This makes the weight we accord to the impact of climate change 
on future people—including those of the far future—extraordinarily important 
(Grubb, 1995, p. 472). Utilitarianism normally weights the well-being of all 
individuals equally, exposing it to the objection that it can require us to make huge 
sacrifices. Counting the utility of future people as the same as that of present ones, for 
example, could oblige us to save nearly all of our income, because the long-term 
payoffs could be so great. Correspondingly, any permanent loss, however 
insignificant, becomes with time all but infinitely costly (Farber and Hemmersbaugh, 
1993, p. 291; Summers and Zeckhauser, 2008, p. 128; cf. Hepburn, 2006, p. 112). In 
the case of global warming, abatement measures „would confer benefits not only in 
2100 but in every subsequent year, perhaps for millions of years.‟ If we count future 
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people‟s utility equally with our own, we might be required to make huge sacrifices 
for the sake of trivial future benefits, because over time those benefits would add up 
to be so great (Nordhaus, 2008, pp. 182-83; Posner 2004, quotation at p. 252; 
Weisbach and Sunstein, 2007, pp. 1-2).  
 Considerable abatement can be undertaken at minimal cost. Some measures 
may even save us money (Spash, 2005, pp. 162-63). Nevertheless, critics argue that 
mitigation on the scale envisioned by Al Gore or the Stern Review is likely to prove 
costly. While even these plans should cost less than two percent of world income 
(Nordhaus, 2008, p. 90; Quiggin 2008, p. 198), in absolute terms this is a large sum. 
At the same time, many economists point to the likelihood that growth will make our 
descendants richer. This raises an egalitarian objection to aggressive abatement 
measures: „Can we justify current generations sacrificing 2-3% of GWP to increase 
the wealth of future generations who even after deduction for the high damage 
scenario are 2-15 times richer than the present generation?‟ (Lind, 1995, p. 384.)  
 It should be worrying enough for egalitarians that refusing to discount could 
require today‟s rich to sacrifice for those who will be far richer tomorrow. What is 
really troubling is that drastic abatement could impose a heavy burden on the world‟s 
poor. „[T]he one thing that is certain about the global warming issue is that an 
immediate significant cut in fossil fuel consumption means a drastic cut in world 
energy consumption and hence in standards of living‟, warns Wilfred Beckerman 
(1995, p. 79). „And the social and political upheavals to which this would lead would 
also be catastrophic. Furthermore...a rise in income levels is the only way that the 
urgent environmental problems facing the 75 per cent of the world's population that 
live in developing countries can be overcome.' While rich countries may be able to 
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weather a depression without widespread death and disease, this is not true of the poor 
ones (Beckerman, 1995, p. 16; Malnes, 1995, p. 125).  
 The solution, in the eyes of many economists, is to discount benefits to future 
people. This will prevent the present from being sacrificed to the demands of a rich 
but enormously populous future (Arrow, 1999). Moreover, discounting seems 
consistent with the standard assumption that an additional unit of income to the rich 
provides less utility than the same increment to the poor. As Colin Price (2003) notes, 
diminishing marginal utility is widely seen as the „respectable case for discounting‟.  
 Nevertheless, this solution is ad hoc: discounting the future does nothing to 
solve the more general problem that utilitarianism is too demanding (Caney, 2008, pp. 
550-51). Moreover, it misleadingly implies that future people‟s consumption counts 
for less, when what we really mean is that the consumption of the rich matters less, or 
that we value equality among generations, or that no generation should be asked to 
sacrifice too much. Still worse, even if we discount, utilitarianism still carries the risk 
that the poor will be sacrificed to the rich if the gains are great enough. We might 
respond by putting another finger on the scales, so that benefits that convey the same 
utility to the poor matter more (Cowen and Parfit, 1992, pp. 148-49). Yet the risk 
remains that if there are enough well-off people, or if the benefits are far enough in 
the future, the needs of the poor can be outweighed by the luxuries of the rich (Crisp, 
2003, p. 754; Meyer and Roser, 2009, pp. 234-35; Roser 2009b, p. 15).  
 The root of the problem is the belief that we should maximize utility in the 
first place. In reality, most of us think we have a clearer duty to ensure a „minimum 
level of well-being below which no generation should fall‟ (Broome, 1992, quotation 
at p. 106; Roser 2009b, pp. 13-15; cf. Cowen and Parfit, 1992, pp. 148-49). This is 
usually presented as protecting people‟s rights (Caney, 2008; Spash, 2005, pp. 224-
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29). Even those who deny that we have strong positive obligations to the inhabitants 
of other countries can agree that it is wrong, other things being equal, to harm them 
(Shapcott 2008). It is plausible that the same goes for other generations (Davidson, 
2008). Thomas Schelling‟s comparison of climate change mitigation with a „foreign 
aid programme‟ misses the mark because the question is not one of helping future 
people (Sunstein, 2007, pp. 266-67). A closer analogy would be with the decision not 
to rape and pillage one‟s neighbours.  
 Yet a focus on the negative right not to be harmed by climate change risks 
neglecting the positive right to development. Draconian curbs on carbon emissions 
could mire many people and countries in life-threatening poverty. It is true that 
climate change is an act of commission, whereas the failure to address poverty is an 
act of omission (Dasgupta 2008, p. 159; Spash 2005, 239). Yet most people probably 
do not much care whether they are killed by climate change or by anopheles 
mosquitos. Moreover, rights are sometimes viewed as absolute „side-constraints‟ that 
forbid us from sacrificing one person‟s prerogatives in order to preserve another‟s 
(Nozick, 1974, pp. 28-29). If we take this view, we may not be able to make the 
tradeoffs necessary to help as many people as possible. 
PRIORITY TO THE IMPOVERISHED 
 It may be best to speak not of rights, but rather of the importance of 
minimizing deprivation. Both the priority and sufficiency views stress this objective, 
but they define it differently. Weighted prioritarianism accords greater importance to 
benefits insofar as the recipients are badly off. Yet it allows sufficient benefits to the 
well-off to trump this priority. Recognising this danger, Rawls (1971/1999) rejects 
utilitarianism in favour of absolute priority for the worst-off (Meyer and Roser, 2009). 
Under conditions of moderate scarcity and full compliance, both of which Rawls 
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assumes, this would guarantee everyone enough to live on. In the real world, however, 
where some countries face extreme scarcity and not everybody abides by Rawls‟ 
demands, it could lead to unacceptable tradeoffs (Wolf, 2009, p. 357).  If climate 
change threatens to kill a hundred people, absolute prioritarianism may seem to 
require us to prevent it even if this means condemning a million people to poverty.
2
  
 Sufficientiarians, in contrast, seek to ensure that as large a share of people as 
possible can lead a satisfactory life. They set the bar higher than survival: a sufficient 
life entails more than „merely having enough to get along or enough to make life 
marginally tolerable‟ and should be rich enough to be „deeply satisfying‟ (Frankfurt, 
1987, p. 38; Frankfurt, 1997, p. 5). Whereas absolute prioritarianism requires us to 
give priority to the worst off regardless of the cost, sufficientarians allow us to help 
many badly off people even at the expense of a smaller number of the former (Meyer 
and Roser, 2009, p. 224; cf. Wolf, 2009, p. 352). Nevertheless, sufficientarians hold 
that gains above this generous minimum lack moral urgency. By any reasonable 
standard most people in the developed world have reached this threshold. Indeed, 
some survey research indicates that above a certain level, increased income does not 
bring greater societal happiness at all (di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006, p. 26; Layard, 
2005; cf. Cowen, 2007, pp. 23-27). Thus sufficientarianism forbids robbing the poor 
for the sake of the rich (Meyer and Roser, 2009, p. 235).  
 If we consider future people our moral equals, there seems no reason not to 
redistribute between generations as well as within them. Absolute prioritarianism 
demands that we redistribute to the worst off. Sufficientarianism calls on us to offer a 
satisfactory life to the largest proportion of people possible (Author, 2009, pp. 5-9; 
Gaspart and Gosseries, 2007; Gosseries, 2004; cf. Buchanan, forthcoming, pp. 54-55). 
On either view we should put the needs of the hungry present before the wealthy 
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future (Beckerman and Pasek, 2001, pp. 63-65). This is not to say that we can plunder 
the environment at will. Even much richer future people deserve protection against 
being poisoned or cooked (Caney, 2008, p. 551; Spash, 2005, p. 228). Such harms 
would result in another sort of deprivation. But when it is a question of consumption 
benefits for tomorrow‟s rich or today‟s poor, we ought to favor the latter.  
 On either view it is fair to make demands on today‟s rich countries. Compared 
with them, the Third World is likely to remain poor for many decades. Assistance 
from rich states will still benefit people who are on average worse off (Schelling 
1995, p. 398). Nevertheless, if we wish to maximize aid to the poor, it might make 
more sense to invest the money in other ways. Some argue that poor countries would 
gain more from investing in adaptation than by curbing their carbon emissions. It 
could be more efficient for rich states to pay compensation to poor ones for climate 
change, or to give them direct assistance in adapting. Finally, we might help poor 
people more by simply investing the money in other projects, such as wiping out 
malaria (Beckerman, 1995; Goklany, 2001, p. 81; Schelling 1997; Tol, 2008, p. 442).  
THE RISK OF DISASTER 
 It may seem that considerations of equity speak for not for mitigation, but for 
adaptation and compensation. This is not the case. First, it is not clear whether one 
can adequately compensate people for the loss of nature. People may not be willing to 
trade away the forests and oceans for bigger houses or better healthcare, and we might 
think there was something wrong with them if they were (Neumayer 1999, 40-41). 
Second, while alternative investments may enable us to protect or compensate future 
generations, they do not guarantee that we will actually do it. Even if environmental 
preservation has a lower aggregate payoff, it may be a surer means of seeing that the 
benefits reach the right parties (Farber and Hemmersbaugh, 1993, pp. 297-98; Lind, 
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1995; Revesz, 1999, pp. 991-92). Third, though poor humans may successfully adapt 
to climate change, it is clear that many non-humans will not (Shue, 1995, p. 255). 
Worldwide, there are fifty birds for every human. Even in densely settled Britain, wild 
mammals considerably outnumber human beings (Gleich, Maxeiner, Miersch and 
Nicolay, 2002, pp. 262-67). The destruction of many of these animals‟ habitats can 
only produce enormous suffering. If animals have moral standing, then 
intergenerational justice must take account of their interests (Krebs, 2003; cf. 
Gosseries, 2004, pp. 262-63).   
 Most important, climate change may turn out far worse than we expect. If this 
is the case, our descendants could be poorer than we are. Sensible advocates of 
discounting based on marginal utility recognise that it is a gamble, albeit a gamble 
with favourable odds (Schelling, 1995, p. 389; cf. Sunstein, 2007, p. 258). Even an 
optimist like Beckerman admits the „remote possibility‟ that global warming could 
leave future generations worse off (Beckerman, 1995, 152; Beckerman and Hepburn, 
2007, pp. 190-91; Beckerman and Pasek, 2001, pp. 99, 105). If we are very unlucky, it 
could „effectively destroy planet Earth as we know it‟ or even leave the earth 
uninhabitable (Broome, 1992, pp. 15-16, 23; Weitzman, 2007; Weitzman 2009, 
quotation at p. 5). Richard Weitzman (2009, p. 1) notes „deep structural uncertainty in 
the science coupled with an economic inability to evaluate meaningfully the 
catastrophic losses from disastrous temperature changes. The climate science seems to 
be saying that the probability of a disastrous collapse of planetary welfare is 
nonnegligible, even if this tiny probability is not objectively knowable.'   
 Nordhaus (2008, pp. 28, 145-47) rules out such „genuinely catastrophic 
outcomes‟ by assumption, noting that „preliminary runs‟ of his model „suggest‟ that 
climate change poses no risk of „a permanent Great Depression, civilizational 
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collapse, or even human extinction.' Yet he confesses that „[u]ntil geophysical 
modelers develop mechanisms for generating abrupt or catastrophic changes, there is 
little that economic models such as the present one can do to introduce results based 
on established scientific findings in integrated assessment models‟. Indeed, „we 
cannot rule out the potential for catastrophic impacts that might justify trillions of 
dollars of abatement costs.‟ Nordhaus thinks climate change won‟t wreck the planet, 
but he isn‟t sure. Meanwhile, „[w]e should start with the clear and present dangers, 
after which we can turn to the unclear and distant threats‟.  
 This is embarrassingly weak. First, we cannot assume that incrementalism will 
work. If climate change poses the risk of catastrophe, we may need to act now to avert 
it. The tendency to start off by addressing likely risks while ignoring small ones, 
however catastrophic, is common; it seems to explain such decisions as the failure to 
wear seatbelts (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 2000, pp. 74-75). When made by 
drivers, this error is understandable; it is less so coming from a leading economist. 
Moreover, uncertainty about climate change is, if anything, grounds for greater 
caution rather than less (Broome, 1992, pp. 17-18). The problem is not just that we 
might be unlucky; we could also be wrong about how likely catastrophe is (Arrow et 
al., 1996a, p. 67; Howarth, 2003, p. 261). As Weitzman (2009, p. 5) observes:   
The tiny probabilities of nightmare impacts of climate change are all 
such crude ballpark estimates (and they would occur so far in the future) 
that there is a tendency in the literature to dismiss altogether these highly 
uncertain forecasts on the “scientific” grounds that they are much too 
speculative to be taken seriously….[But] other things being equal, the 
more speculative and fuzzy are the tiny tail probabilities of extreme 
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events, the less ignorable and the more serious is the impact on present 
discounted expected utility for a risk-averse agent. 
 Here the preponderant weight of the future re-emerges. When it is a question 
of how many people fall below sufficiency, there is no longer a justification based on 
declining marginal utility for discounting our descendants‟ consumption. Global 
warming could bring future people below sufficiency for many decades, for centuries, 
or even for good. In contrast, provided economic growth continues, the material 
misery of today‟s poor countries „must eventually be eradicated‟ (Beckerman and 
Pasek, 2001, p. 119). Barring some other catastrophe such as large-scale nuclear war, 
if economic growth does not continue, it is likely to be the result of climate change 
(Malnes, 1995, pp. 27-28; Posner, 2004, p. 165). If we must choose between two 
policies, both of which threaten to bring people below sufficiency, we ought to choose 
the one that minimizes expected deprivation—that is to say, we should multiply the 
number of individuals by the probability of their being deprived (cf. Malnes, 1995, pp. 
64-65). Given the vast number of future people, a small risk of permanent 
impoverishment must outweigh even certain poverty over a few generations.
3
  
 Moreover, even ambitious abatement measures need bring no-one below 
sufficiency. While their cost would be large in absolute terms, as a percentage of 
world income they are small, with Nordhaus (2008, p. 90) estimating their cost at 1.5 
percent. Weitzman (2007, p. 720) notes the Stern Review‟s stress on 
the immorality of relegating future generations to live under the shadow 
of the open-ended possibilities of uncertain large-scale changes in the 
climate system, when for a mere annuity cost of a percent or two (or at 
most three) of GDP each year we might have purchased an insurance 
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policy on their behalf that avoided this scary uncertainty (or at least 
greatly reduced it) …. 
Ambitious mitigation need not bring a single person below the poverty line so long 
as we are prepared to redistribute enough resources (Caney, 2009, p. 175; Gardiner, 
2006a, pp. 55 n. 68, 56 n. 71; Wolf, 2009, p. 362). „The fallacy‟, Richard Posner 
(2004, p. 115) observes, „is to think that we have a choice between only two 
policies: we can either expand health insurance or take measures against 
catastrophic risks. We can do both. We would just have to give up something else.' 
MOTIVATING MITIGATION 
 Yet we show little inclination to do so. While Americans are concerned about 
the possibility of species extinctions, they do not seem troubled that climate change 
will kill large numbers of animals. Nor do they see it as a major threat to themselves 
(Krosnick et al., 2006, p. 32; Sunstein, 2007, pp. 29-31, 42-48). Since today‟s rich 
humans reap most of the benefits of carbon emissions, while externalising most of the 
costs to other countries, species and generations, they have a strong incentive to 
continue (cf. Gardiner, 2006b).  Nor do the poor of the world seem ready to make 
many cuts that restrict their economic development for the sake of preventing climate 
change (Malnes, 1995, p. 125).  
 If neither the rich nor the poor are willing to make the necessary sacrifices, 
how are we to avert the risk of catastrophic climate change? One possibility is for 
powerful countries to impose much of the costs on weaker ones—a process which 
may already be underway (Isla, 2009). Of course this would be deeply unfair. In 
particular, policies that deprived the poor of necessities so that the rich could continue 
their „luxury emissions‟ would be a crying injustice (Harris, 2003, p. 150; Page, 2008, 
p. 565; Shue, 1993). All the same, it would be a lesser injustice than risking long-term 
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catastrophe. As Clark Wolf (2009, p. 373) puts it, „Unless our efforts to mitigate the 
effects of climate change will cause more misery and deprivation than they will 
relieve, we have an obligation of justice to undertake them.‟ Even the prospect of 
condemning several more generations to poverty—terrible in itself—dwindles next to 
the risk of permanent impoverishment.  
 Nevertheless, far better that the rich should pay for abatement. The problem is 
that today‟s rich are unwilling to do enough. And indeed, while they should do more, 
it does not seem fair to ask them to assume the whole burden. We ought to pursue 
ambitious mitigation, because we live at a time when climate change is coming to a 
head.  But this may force us to endure a lower material standard of living than our 
parents (Malnes, 1995, p. 108). At the same time, on most estimates, even with 
climate change, our descendants are likely to be richer than we are. The problem is 
not that they are likely to be impoverished if we do not do enough. Rather it is that if 
things turn out much worse than we expect, they could be disastrous indeed. 
Abatement is akin to taking out an insurance policy: it „reduces the variance in what 
may happen‟ (Broome, 1992, quotation at p. 17; Roser 2009a, p. 21, n. 46).4  
 Suppose I hold a factory job with good prospects for promotion. Barring 
accidents, I can expect to save enough to leave my heirs a large legacy. But if I am 
killed on the job, I will leave my family destitute. Clearly I ought to take out life 
insurance. To point out that my heirs will probably be richer is no excuse for exposing 
them to disaster. Yet finding the payments onerous, I may be tempted to skimp, and 
hope for the best. This would be the wrong decision. It would be better for me to save 
less, and use the money to pay the insurance premiums. This would not be unfair to 
my heirs. If I live to a ripe old age, they will inherit a smaller fortune, but still more 
than I have now, and they will have comparatively little interest in „potential 
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gains…above the minimum that can be guaranteed by the maximin approach‟. On the 
other hand, if I neglect insurance, the results could be appalling. This is a 
paradigmatic instance for precautionary action (Gardiner, 2006a, p. 47). It is better for 
them to receive a smaller inheritance, but to be spared the risk of disaster. 
 Likewise, in the case of global warming, we ought to take out „insurance‟. But 
it is only fair to ask our descendants to pay part of the premium. Some find the notion 
that we could legitimately pass on costs to our descendants hard to swallow. Is not 
„seeing our children and grandchildren do better than we have done…the real promise 
of America‟, as Senator Hatch asserts (States News Service, 2009a)? It is hard to see 
why this should be the case. We have no reason to think that future people will be 
more virtuous or harder-working than we are. An inheritance equal to our own is the 
obvious baseline—neither more nor less (Barry, 1983, p. 20).  
 Moreover, the present generation is far more likely to support abatement if it 
can pass on part of the costs (Bradford 1999, p. 42). Most authors deplore 
intergenerational cost-shifting as a form of exploitation (Bertram, 2007; Gardiner, 
2006b). But here—as in the case of the life insurance—it is both fair and in our 
descendants‟ own interest. The challenge is to „implement a scheme whereby the 
future generations would compensate the present and near-term generations for their 
investments in emission abatement programmes‟ (Lind, 1995, p. 382). 
 One means is by borrowing money and running deficits (Bradford, 1999, p. 
42; Revesz, 1999, p. 1007). True, it is not possible for the present generation taken as 
a whole to „pass on the bill‟. Any money borrowed now comes out of today‟s 
spending and investment, and will in turn be repaid to future people (Buchanan, 2005, 
p. 324). Nevertheless, borrowing transfers wealth from present-day creditors to 
present-day citizens and taxpayers, and in turn from future taxpayers to future 
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creditors. It benefits today‟s taxpayers at the expense of tomorrow‟s. And it is today‟s 
taxpayers who must be persuaded to foot the bill. 
 Running up government debt is often considered a prototypical case of 
intergenerational injustice. „What will…$400 million for climate change research do 
to help you and your family?‟ demands US Representative Michele Bachmann, 
complaining that the Obama administration‟s budget would „cost the American 
taxpayers, their children and their grandchildren more than $1 trillion‟ (States News 
Service, 2009b). Warning of „global warming taxes that will hike costs for every 
American who turns on a light switch‟, Representative Lynn Westmoreland (2009) 
denounces a „felonious theft from future generations with the trillions in IOU‟s we‟ll 
be handing them.‟ But even if running up debt means our descendants pay higher 
taxes, this will not make them poorer than we are so long as the rise in pretax incomes 
keeps pace (Buchanan, 2005, p. 314; Gaspart and Gosseries, 2007, pp. 206-7). Critics 
of deficit spending must explain why we owe them more. 
 The second way to compensate ourselves is to save and invest less in other 
areas (cf. Bertram, 2007, pp. 84-87; Gosseries, 2004). Running deficits can also 
reduce private investment through the „crowding out‟ effect. „[A] global climate 
initiative that is for reasons economic or political likely to crowd out basic scientific 
research‟, Lawrence Summers and Richard Zeckhauser argue (2008, p. 133), „should 
be judged more harshly than an equivalent project that would affect only 
consumption.‟ But again, this is true only if we ought to transfer resources to the 
future. So long as we do not spend so much as to stop growth in its tracks, our 
descendants will still be richer than we are. Nobody is talking of spending this much. 
'[N]o substantive case‟, observes Clive Spash (2005, p. 238), „has been made that 
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controlling emissions would do more than reduce the rate of growth of material 
consumption for industrially developed economies.'  
 Government borrowing and reduced investment should be used to fund 
abatement not only at home, but also, and especially, in the poor countries. Not only is 
these countries‟ participation essential in the long run, but here there is the strongest 
egalitarian case for tapping the wealth of our descendants, who can be expected, if 
catastrophe is averted, to be far richer than inhabitants of poor countries today. It is 
well known that the rich countries contribute less foreign aid than philosophers say 
they should. They may be more willing to fork out if they can pass on part of the bill. 
Happily, there is nothing unjust in their doing so.
5
 
CONCLUSION 
 Utilitarianism notoriously allows the trivial interests of the many to 
overwhelm the vital interests of the few. This is enough, in Nordhaus‟s (2008, pp. 
182-83) eyes, to damn the Stern Review. „Using its growth projections‟, he charges,  
the…Review would justify reducing per capita consumption for one year 
today from $6,600 to $2,900 in order to prevent a reduction of 
consumption from $87,000 to $86,900 starting two centuries hence and 
continuing at that rate forever after. This bizarre result arises because the 
value of the future consumption stream is so high with near-zero time 
discounting that we should sacrifice a large fraction of today's income in 
order to increase a far-future income stream by a very tiny fraction. 
Nordhaus‟s solution is to discount the value of consumption by future people. But to 
do so is misleading. In reality, we do not—or, at any rate should not—believe that 
people‟s consumption matters less merely because they will live in the future. As 
Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit (1992, p. 148) advise, „we should say what we mean.‟  
     17 
What we really mean is that no benefits to the well-off, however numerous, can ever 
justify depriving the needy. To put it in economists‟ language, we should rethink our 
approach to the elasticity of marginal utility (Dasgupta, 2008, p. 157). Yet given the 
vast number of future people, even setting this elasticity very high may not suffice (cf. 
Arrow et al., 1996b, pp. 136-37). We need an ethics that will not allow the luxuries of 
the rich to trump the vital needs of the poor. We find this framework in either absolute 
prioritarianism or sufficientarianism. 
 Once we reject utilitarianism, we no longer need to discount the future. There 
is more than enough wealth for us to minimize expected deprivation without assuming 
intolerable burdens. We have the choice of two ideal type strategies for doing this. On 
the one hand, we can pursue mitigation; on the other, we can let the planet warm on 
the assumption that our savings and additional growth will allow us to adapt 
successfully to climate change, or compensate for the damage. Adaptation and 
compensation might be the best strategy if our goal were to maximize expected value 
for humans. But it carries the small risk of long-term or even permanent catastrophe. 
In contrast, so long as mitigation is not so drastic as to halt growth, or some other 
catastrophe intervenes, within a century even today‟s poor states should be far richer. 
Given the vast number of future people who would suffer from runaway climate 
change, minimizing expected deprivation calls for precaution. As Clark Wolf (2009, 
p. 373) says, „Present investment to mitigate climate change does not aim to make 
later generations better off than earlier ones. Instead, it aims to protect later 
generations from risks that might make them much worse off than earlier ones.'
6
  
 We can easily afford to spend one or two percent of world income and still 
meet everyone‟s basic needs. The benefits the rich would forego in order to avert the 
risk of disaster are comparatively trivial. Yet they refuse to do so. Fortunately, 
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through long-term borrowing and diverting funds from other investments, we can 
ensure that the rich of the future help us do our duty. As Wilfred Beckerman and 
Joanna Pasek (2001, p. 105, emphasis added) observe,  
Future generations are likely to be much richer than is the current generation, 
and there is little reason to believe that the steady rise in real incomes will be 
significantly reduced by climate change….However, we do have a moral 
obligation to take account of the possibility...that climate change could seriously 
depress the living standards of future generations. 
Well said. But this means the world has little to lose and much to gain from borrowing 
to finance abatement. Our much richer descendants can well afford to pay off some 
debt if this ensures that they really are richer. 
  
                                               
1 Here and throughout the paper „egalitarian‟ refers not only to theories stressing the importance of 
equality per se, but also prioritarian and sufficientarian arguments that stress the importance of 
preventing deprivation or helping the worst off. 
2 Or does it? Rawls (1971/1999, p. 84) suggests that the worst-off might be defined as „unskilled 
worker[s]‟, or „all persons with less than half of the median‟ wealth. This is to define „worst off‟ fairly 
inclusively. In this case, Meyer‟s and Roser‟s (2009, p. 224, emphasis added) warning that maximin 
requires us to prioritise „the smallest improvement of the smallest number of the worst off‟ may not 
apply to Rawls. 
3 The very worst scenario, to be sure, is that we spend lots of money and catastrophic climate change 
ensues anyway. It may appear that absolute prioritarianism requires us to avoid that (Chisholm and 
Clarke, 1993, p. 114). But Rawls requires us to minimize deprivation for individuals, not avoid worst-
case scenarios. Someone choosing behind the veil of ignorance would select the policy that minimized 
her risk of ending up impoverished—which, this paper argues, means drastic mitigation. 
4
 Why, rather than pursuing abatement, should we not just literally take out insurance? Some have 
suggested this solution. Yet even if money can compensate for environmental damage (a big if), it 
would not be an adequate buffer if we were unlucky. If we suffered a worldwide disaster, even if it did 
not lead to mass deaths or human extinction, it is highly unlikely that insurers could compensate all 
losses (Price, 2003).  
5 Anti-cosmopolitans might criticise the transfer of resources to other countries. By averting the risk of 
climatic catastrophe, however, such transfers will benefit the rich countries‟ own future citizens. 
6 This does raise the concern that even tiny risks that the world could fall permanently below 
sufficiency would acquire huge weight, requiring us „to devote all our resources to catastrophe-averting 
projects above the modest expenditures necessary to maintain at a subsistence level the scientific and 
technical personnel employed on the projects‟ (Posner, 2004, p. 153). I plan to address this issue in a 
future paper. 
     19 
References 
Arrow, K. J. (1999) „Discounting, Morality, and Gaming‟, in P. R. Portney and J. P. 
 Weyant (eds.) Discounting and Intergenerational Equity. Washington: 
 Resources for the Future, pp. 13-21. 
Arrow, K. J. et al. (1996a) „Decision-Making Frameworks for Addressing Climate 
 Change‟, in J. P. Bruce, H. Lee and E. F. Haites (eds.) Climate Change 1995: 
 Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: 
 Cambridge University Press, pp. 53-78. 
Arrow, K. J. et al. (1996b) „Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic 
 Efficiency‟, in J. P. Bruce, H. Lee and E. F. Haites (eds.) Climate Change 
 1995: Economic and  Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: 
 Cambridge University Press, pp. 125-44. 
Author (2009) „Non-Identity, Equity and Exploitation‟. Unpublished manuscript. 
Barry, B. (1983) „Intergenerational Justice in Energy Policy‟, in D. MacLean and P. 
 G. Brown (eds.) Energy and the Future. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 
 pp. 15-30. 
Beckerman, W. (1995) Small is Stupid: Blowing the Whistle on the Greens. London: 
 Duckworth. 
Beckerman, W. (1999) „Sustainable Development and Our Obligations to Future 
 Generations‟, in A. Dobson (ed.) Fairness and Futurity: Essays on 
 Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, pp. 71-92. 
Beckerman, W. and Hepburn, C. (2007) „Ethics of the Discount Rate in the Stern 
 Review on the Economics of Climate Change‟, World Economics, 8 (1), 187-
 210. 
     20 
Beckerman, W. and Pasek, J. (2001) Justice, Posterity and the Environment. New 
 York: Oxford University Press. 
Bertram, C. (2007) „Exploitation and Intergenerational Justice‟, Imprints, 10 (1), 69-
 92. 
Bradford, D. F. (1999) „On the Uses of Benefit-Cost Reasoning in Choosing Policy  
 Toward Global Climate Change‟, in P. R. Portney and J. P. Weyant (eds.), 
 Discounting and Intergenerational Equity. Washington: Resources for the 
 Future, pp. 37-43. 
Broome, J. (1992) Counting the Cost of Global Warming. Cambridge, UK: White 
 Horse Press. 
Buchanan, N. H. (2005) „Social Security, Generational Justice, and Long-Term 
 Deficits‟, Tax Law Review, 58, 275-326. 
Buchanan, N. H. „What Do We Owe Future Generations?‟ forthcoming in George 
 Washington University Law Review. 
Caney, S. (2008) „Human Rights, Climate Change and Discounting‟, Environmental 
 Politics, 17 (4), 536-55. 
Caney, S. (2009) „Climate Change and the Future: Discounting for Time, Wealth and 
 Risk‟, Journal of Social Philosophy, 40 (2): 163-86. 
Casal, P. (2007) „Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough‟, Ethics, 117 (2), 293-326. 
Chisholm, A. M. and Clarke, H. (1993) „Natural Resource Management and the  
Precautionary Principle‟, in E. Dommen (ed.) Fair Principles for Sustainable 
Development. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 109-22. 
Cowen, T. (2007), „Caring about the Distant Future: Why It Matters and What It 
 Means‟, University of Chicago Law Review, 74 (1), 5-40. 
     21 
Cowen, T. and Parfit D. (1992) „Against the Social Discount Rate‟, in P. Laslett and J. 
 Hishkin (eds.) Justice between Age Groups and Generations. New Haven: 
 Yale University Press, pp. 144-61. 
Crisp, R. (2003) „Equality, Priority, and Compassion‟, Ethics, 113 (4), 745-63. 
Dasgupta, P. (2007) „Commentary: The Stern Review‟s Economics of Climate 
 Change‟, National Institute Economic Review, 199, 4-7. 
Dasgupta, P. (2008) „Discounting Climate Change‟, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 
 37 (2-3), 141-69. 
Davidson, M. D. (2008) „Wrongful Harm to Future Generations: The Case of Climate 
 Change‟, Environmental Values, 17 (4), 471-88. 
Di Tella, R. and MacCulloch, R. (2006) „Some Uses of Happiness Data in 
 Economics‟, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20 (1), 25-46. 
Farber, D. A. and Hemmersbaugh, P. A. (1993) „The Shadow of the Future: Discount 
 Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment‟, Vanderbilt Law Review 49 
 (2), 267-304. 
Frankfurt, H. (1987) „Equality as a Moral Ideal‟, Ethics, 98 (1), 21-43. 
Frankfurt, H. (1997) „Equality and Respect‟, Social Research, 64 (1), 3-13. 
Gardiner, S. A. (2004) „Ethics and Global Climate Change‟, Ethics, 114 (3), 555-600. 
Gardiner, S. A. (2006a) „A Core Precautionary Principle‟, Journal of Political 
 Philosophy, 14 (1), 33-60. 
Gardiner, S. A. (2006b) „A Perfect Moral Storm: Intergenerational Ethics and the 
 Problem of Moral Corruption‟, Environmental Values, 15 (3), 397-413. 
Gaspart, F. and Gosseries, A. (2007) „Are Generational Savings Unjust?‟ Politics, 
 Philosophy & Economics, 6 (2), 193-217. 
     22 
Gleich, M., Maxeiner, D., Miersch, M. and Nicolay F. (2002) Life Counts: 
 Cataloguing Life on Earth. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. 
Godard, O. (2008) „The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change: 
 Contents, Insights and Assessment of the Critical Debate‟, Surveys and 
 Perspectives Integrating Environment and Society, 1, 17-36. 
Goklany, I. M. (2001) The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of  
 Environmental Risk Assessment. Washington: CATO Institute. 
Gosseries, A. (2004) Penser la justice entre les générations. De l’affaire de Perruche 
 à la réforme des retraites. Paris: Alto Aubier. 
Grubb, M. (1995) „Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on 
 Climate Change‟, International Affairs, 71 (3), 463-96. 
Harris, P. G. (2003) „Fairness, Responsibility and Climate Change‟, Ethics and 
 International Affairs, 17 (1), 149-56. 
Hepburn, C. (2006) „Valuing the Far-Off Future: Discounting and Its Alternatives‟, in 
 G. Atkinson, S. Dietz and E. Neumayer (eds.) Handbook of Sustainable 
 Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 109-24. 
Howarth, R. B. (2003) „Discounting and Sustainability: Towards Reconciliation‟, 
 International Journal of Sustainable Development 6 (1), 87-97. 
Isla, A. (2009) „Who Pays for the Kyoto Protocol? Selling Oxygen and Selling Sex in 
 Costa Rica‟, in A. Salleh (ed.) Eco-Sufficiency and Global Justice: Women 
 Write Political Ecology. London: Pluto, pp. 199-217. 
Jamieson, D. (2005) „Adaptation, Mitigation and Justice‟, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong 
 and R. Howarth (eds.), Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, 
 Politics, Ethics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 217-48. 
     23 
Klinsky S. and Dowlatabadi H. (2009) „Conceptualisations of Justice in Climate 
 Policy‟, Climate Policy 9 (1), 88-108. 
Krebs. A. (2001) „Wieviel Natur schulden wir der Zukunft? Eine Kritik am 
 zukunftsethischen Egalitarismus‟, in D. Birnbacher and G. Brudermüller (eds.) 
 Zukunftsverantwortung und Generationensolidarität. Würzberg: 
 Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 157-84. 
Krosnick, J. A. et al. (2006) „The Origins and Consequences of Democratic Citizens‟ 
 Policy Agendas: A Study of Popular Concern About Global Warming‟, 
 Climatic Change 77 (1-2), 7-43. 
Layard, R. (2005) Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. New York: Penguin. 
Lind, R. C. (1995) „Intergenerational Equity, Discounting, and the Role of Cost-
 Benefit Analysis in Evaluating Climate Policy‟, Energy Policy, 23 (4/5), 379-
 89. 
Malnes, R. (1995) Valuing the Environment. Manchester: Manchester University 
 Press. 
McKinnon, C. (2009) „Runaway Climate Change: A Justice-Based Case for 
 Precautions‟, Journal of Social Philosophy, 40 (2), 187-203. 
Meyer, L. H. and Roser, D. (2009) „Enough for the Future‟, in A. Gosseries and L. H. 
 Meyer (eds.), Intergenerational Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
 219-48. 
Neumayer, E. (1999) „Global Warming: Discounting is not the Issue, but 
 Substitutability is‟, Energy Policy, 27 (1), 33-43. 
Nordhaus, W. (2008) A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on Global 
 Warming. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. 
     24 
Page, E. A. (2007) „Justice Between Generations: Investigating a Sufficientarian 
 Approach‟, Journal of Global Ethics, 3 (1), 3-20. 
Page, E. A. (2008) „Distributing the Burdens of Climate Change‟, Environmental 
 Politics, 17 (4), 556-75. 
Posner, R. (2004) Catastrophe: Risk and Response. New York: Oxford University 
 Press. 
Price, C. (2003) „Diminishing Marginal Utility: The Respectable Case for 
 Discounting?‟  International Journal of Sustainable Development, 6 (1), 117-
 32. 
Quiggin, J. (2008) „Stern and His Critics on Discounting and Climate Change: An 
 Editorial Essay‟, Climatic Change 89 (3-4), 195-205. 
Rawls, J. (1971/1999) A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
 University Press. 
Revesz, R. L. (1999) „Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the 
 Discounting of Human Lives‟, Columbia Law Review 99 (4), 941-1017. 
Roser, D. (2009a) „A Baker‟s Dozen for Future Generations‟. Unpublished 
 manuscript, University of Zurich, 
http://ecophilosopher.com/documents/Climate%20Change,%20Uncertainty,%20and%
20Rights.pdf. 
Roser, D. (2009b) „The Discount Rate: A Small Number With a Big Impact‟, in 
 Applied Ethics: Life, Environment and Society. Sapporo: Centre for Applied 
 Ethics and Philosophy, Hokkaido University, pp. 10-25. 
Schelling, T. C. (1995) „Intergenerational Discounting‟, Energy Policy, 23 (4-5), 395-
 401. 
     25 
Schelling, T. C. (1997) „The Cost of Combating Global Warming: Facing the 
 Tradeoffs‟, Foreign Affairs, 76 (6), 8-14. 
Shapcott, R. (2008) „Anti-Cosmopolitanism, Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Harm  
 Principle‟, Review of International Studies 34 (2), 185-206. 
Shue, H. (1993) „Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions‟, Law & Policy, 15 
 (1), 39-59. 
Shue, H. (1995) „Avoidable Necessity: Global Warming, International Fairness, and  
 Alternative Energy‟, in I. Shapiro and J. W. DeCew, Theory and Practice. 
 New York, New York University Press, pp. 239-64. 
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B. and Lichtenstein S. (2000) „Accident Probabilities and Seat 
 Belt Usage: A Psychological Perspective‟, in P. Slovic (ed.), The Perception 
 of Risk. London: Earthscan, pp. 73-79. 
Spash, C. (2005) Greenhouse Economics: Value and Ethics, second edition. London:  
Routledge. 
States News Service (2009a) „Hatch: President‟s Budget for 2010 Would Hike Taxes, 
 Kill Jobs‟, 30 March. 
States News Service (2009b) „Op-Ed: Pet Projects Bog Down Stimulus‟, 8 February. 
Summers, L. and Zeckhauser, R. (2008) „Policymaking for Posterity‟, Journal of Risk 
 and Uncertainty 37 (2-3), 115-40. 
Sunstein, C. R. (2007) Worst-Case Scenarios. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
 Press. 
Tol, R. S. J. (2008) „Why Worry About Climate Change? A Research Agenda‟, 
 Environmental Values, 17 (4), 437-70. 
Weisbach, D. A. and Sunstein, C. R. (2007) „Symposium on Intergenerational Equity 
 and Discounting‟, University of Chicago Law Review, 74 (1), 1-3. 
     26 
Weitzman, M. L. (2007) „A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
 Change‟, Journal of Economic Literature, 45 (3), 703-24. 
Weitzman, M. L. (2009) „On Modelling and Interpreting the Economics of 
 Catastrophic Climate  Change‟, Review of Economics and Statistics, 91 (1), 1-
 19. 
Westmoreland, L. (2009) ´Fiscal Sanity Dies in Obama Budget‟, Atlanta Constitution, 
 9 April. 
Wolf, C. (2009) „Intergenerational Justice, Human Needs, and Climate Policy‟, in A. 
 Gosseries and L. H. Meyer (eds.), Intergenerational Justice. Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, pp. 347-76. 
